Washington had more on his mind than the creation of an army and
the siege of Boston. He had also to decide the strategy of the
war. On the long American sea front Boston alone remained in
British hands. New York, Philadelphia, Charleston and other ports
farther south were all, for the time, on the side of the
Revolution. Boston was not a good naval base for the British,
since it commanded no great waterway leading inland. The
sprawling colonies, from the rock-bound coast of New England to
the swamps and forests of Georgia, were strong in their
incoherent vastness. There were a thousand miles of seacoast.
Only rarely were considerable settlements to be found more than a
hundred miles distant from salt water. An army marching to the
interior would have increasing difficulties from transport and
supplies. Wherever water routes could be used the naval power of
the British gave them an advantage. One such route was the
Hudson, less a river than a navigable arm of the sea, leading to
the heart of the colony of New York, its upper waters almost
touching Lake George and Lake Champlain, which in turn led to the
St. Lawrence in Canada and thence to the sea. Canada was held by
the British; and it was clear that, if they should take the city
of New York, they might command the whole line from the mouth of
the Hudson to the St.
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