Howe had the further
advantage of a much larger force. Washington had in all some
twenty thousand men, numbers of them serving for short terms and
therefore for the most part badly drilled. Howe had twenty-five
thousand well-trained soldiers, and he could, in addition, draw
men from the fleet, which would give him in all double the force
of Washington.
In such a situation even the best skill of Washington was likely
only to qualify defeat. He was advised to destroy New York and
retire to positions more tenable. But even if he had so desired,
Congress, his master, would not permit him to burn the city, and
he had to make plans to defend it. Brooklyn Heights so commanded
New York that enemy cannon planted there would make the city
untenable. Accordingly Washington placed half his force on Long
Island to defend Brooklyn Heights and in doing so made the
fundamental error of cutting his army in two and dividing it by
an arm of the sea in presence of overwhelming hostile naval
power.
On the 22d of August Howe ferried fifteen thousand men across the
Narrows to Long Island, in order to attack the position on
Brooklyn Heights from the rear. Before him lay wooded hills
across which led three roads converging at Brooklyn Heights
beyond the hills.
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