It was luck which had far-reaching consequences. Howe had
the fixed idea that to follow the capture of New York by that of
Philadelphia, the most populous city in America, and the seat of
Congress, would mean great glory for himself and a crushing blow
to the American cause. If to this could be added, as he intended,
the occupation of the whole valley of the Hudson, the year 1777
might well see the end of the war. An acute sense of the value of
time is vital in war. Promptness, the quick surprise of the
enemy, was perhaps the chief military virtue of Washington;
dilatoriness was the destructive vice of Howe. He had so little
contempt for his foe that he practised a blighting caution. On
April 12, 1777, Washington, in view of his own depleted force, in
a state of half famine, wrote: "If Howe does not take advantage
of our weak state he is very unfit for his trust." Howe remained
inactive and time, thus despised, worked its due revenge. Later
Howe did move, and with skill, but he missed the rapid
combination in action which was the first condition of final
success. He could have captured Philadelphia in May. He took the
city, but not until September, when to hold it had become a
liability and not an asset. To go there at all was perhaps
unwise; to go in September was for him a tragic mistake.
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