Howe found that
he could send ships up the Hudson, and the American army had to
stand on the banks almost helpless against the mobility of sea
power. Washington's left wing rested on the Hudson and he held
both banks but neither at Peekskill nor, as yet, farther up at
West Point, could his forts prevent the passage of ships. It was
a different matter for the British to advance on land. But the
ships went up and down in the spring of 1777. It would be easy
enough to help Burgoyne when the time should come.
It was summer before Howe was ready to move, and by that time he
had received instructions that his first aim must be to cooperate
with Burgoyne. First, however, he was resolved to have
Philadelphia. Washington watched Howe in perplexity. A great
fleet and a great army lay at New York. Why did they not move?
Washington knew perfectly well what he himself would have done in
Howe's place. He would have attacked rapidly in April the weak
American army and, after destroying or dispersing it, would have
turned to meet Burgoyne coming southward from Canada. Howe did
send a strong force into New Jersey. But he did not know how weak
Washington really was, for that master of craft in war
disseminated with great skill false information as to his own
supposed overwhelming strength.
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