It may be said that the evolutionist writers on ethics seek to base an
ethics of evolution upon the evolution of ethics, but that they are
not always aware of the real nature and difficulties of their task.
Sometimes they seem to think that in tracing the evolution of ethics
they are also and at the same time determining and establishing a
theory of the ethics of evolution. We must avoid this error, and keep
the two problems distinct in our minds. Yet from the nature of the
case it holds true that it is only through the facts which the theory
of evolution establishes or can establish as to the development of
morality that it is able to make any contribution to the solution of
the further question as to the criterion of morality--the question,
that is to say, of moral worth or value.
We cannot, therefore, avoid dealing with the evolution of ethics. But
in what follows I am not considering it for its own sake--though it
is an interesting and important question. In order to simplify
the argument, we may allow what is claimed for it, and give the
evolutionist credit for even greater success on the field of
historical investigation--which is his own field--than he would, if
fair-minded, claim for himself. The problem I have in view lies beyond
this historical question. It is the problem how far the known facts
and probable theories regarding the development of morality can make
any contribution towards determining the standard of worth for our
ideas, our sentiments, and our conduct.
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