Mr Bradley's whole work is ruled by the distinction between
"Appearance" and "Reality," which gives his book a title. On the
one hand there is the Absolute Reality, spoken of as perfect, and
described as all--comprehensive and harmonious throughout. Neither
change nor time nor any relation can belong to it. But intelligence
works by discrimination and comparison; knowledge implies relations;
it is, therefore, excluded from reality. Truth is mere appearance. The
same judgment must be passed on our moral activity. We strive after
and perhaps reach an ideal, or, as Mr Bradley says, we aim at
satisfying a desire; and this, too, is a process far removed from
reality.[1] Goodness, like truth, is mere appearance.
[Footnote 1: Appearance and Reality, pp. 402, 410.]
This needs no elaboration. If all predication involves relation, and
relation is excluded from reality,[1] then no predicate--not even
truth or goodness--can be asserted of the real. Nay more, to be
consistent, we ought not even to say that reality or the Absolute
(for the two terms are here interchangeable) is perfect, or one, or
all-comprehensive, or harmonious: for all these are predicates. _Ens
realissimum_ is the only _ens reale_; all else is mere appearance.
[Footnote 1: Ibid., pp. 32-34.]
Just here, however, lies an indication of another line of thought.
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