Yet that general had shown
such decided ability in certain lines of his profession, and had plainly
in so large a degree won the confidence of the Army of the Potomac
itself, that he did not wish entirely to lose the benefit of his
services. He still hoped that, once actively started in the field, he
might yet develop valuable qualities of leadership. He had substantially
decided to let him have his own way in his proposed campaign against
Richmond by water, and orders to assemble the necessary vessels had been
given before the Harper's Ferry failure was known.
Early on the morning of March 8, the President made one more effort to
convert McClellan to a direct movement against Manassas, but without
success. On the contrary, the general convened twelve of his division
commanders in a council, who voted eight to four for the water route.
This finally decided the question in the President's mind, but he
carefully qualified the decision by two additional war orders of his
own, written without consultation. President's General War Order No. 2
directed that the Army of the Potomac should be immediately organized
into four army corps, to be respectively commanded by McDowell, Sumner,
Heintzelman, and Keyes, and a fifth under Banks. It is noteworthy that
the first three of these had always earnestly advocated the Manassas
movement.
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