General McClellan had not only lost the chance of an easy and brilliant
victory near Washington, but also the possibility of his favorite plan
to move by water to Urbana on the lower Rappahannock, and from there by
a land march _via_ West Point toward Richmond. On that route the enemy
was now in his way. He therefore, on March 13, hastily called a council
of his corps commanders, who decided that under the new conditions it
would be best to proceed by water to Fortress Monroe, and from there
move up the Peninsula toward Richmond. To this new plan, adopted in the
stress of excitement and haste, the President answered through the
Secretary of War on the same day:
"_First_. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it
entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that
position and line of communication."
"_Second_. Leave Washington entirely secure."
"_Third_. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a
new base at Fort Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or, at all
events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy
by some route."
Two days before, the President had also announced a step which he had
doubtless had in contemplation for many days, if not many weeks, namely,
that--
"Major-General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head
of the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from
the command of the other military departments, he retaining command of
the Department of the Potomac.
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