But constitutional indecision
unfitted him to seize the fleeting chances of war. His hope of victory
was always overawed by his fear of defeat. While he commanded during a
large part of the campaign double, and always superior, numbers to the
enemy, his imagination led him continually to double their strength in
his reports. This delusion so wrought upon him that on the night of June
27 he sent the Secretary of War an almost despairing and insubordinate
despatch, containing these inexcusable phrases:
"Had I twenty thousand or even ten thousand fresh troops to use
to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and
shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of
the army.... If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no
thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your
best to sacrifice this army."
Under almost any other ruler such language would have been quickly
followed by trial and dismissal, if not by much severer punishment. But
while Mr. Lincoln was shocked by McClellan's disrespect, he was yet more
startled by the implied portent of the despatch. It indicated a loss of
confidence and a perturbation of mind which rendered possible even a
surrender of the whole army. The President, therefore, with his habitual
freedom from passion, merely sent an unmoved and kind reply:
"Save your army at all events.
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