Its
principal effect upon the Richmond campaign was to turn back McDowell,
who had been started on a land march to unite with the right wing of
McClellan's army, under instructions, however, always to be in readiness
to interpose his force against any attempt of the enemy to march upon
Washington. This campaign of Stonewall Jackson's has been much lauded by
military writers; but its temporary success resulted from good luck
rather than military ability. Rationally considered, it was an
imprudent and even reckless adventure that courted and would have
resulted in destruction or capture had the junction of forces under
McDowell, Shields, and Fremont, ordered by President Lincoln, not been
thwarted by the mistake and delay of Fremont. It was an episode that
signally demonstrated the wisdom of the President in having retained
McDowell's corps for the protection of the national capital.
That, however, was not the only precaution to which the President had
devoted his serious attention. During the whole of McClellan's Richmond
campaign he had continually borne in mind the possibility of his defeat,
and the eventualities it might create. Little by little, that general's
hesitation, constant complaints, and exaggerated reports of the enemy's
strength changed the President's apprehensions from possibility to
probability; and he took prompt measures to be prepared as far as
possible, should a new disaster arise.
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