It is unnecessary to relate in detail the
campaign which followed. Pope intelligently and faithfully performed the
task imposed on him to concentrate his forces and hold in check the
advance of the enemy, which began as soon as the Confederates learned of
the evacuation of Harrison's Landing.
When the Army of the Potomac was ordered to be withdrawn it was clearly
enough seen that the movement might put the Army of Virginia in
jeopardy; but it was hoped that if the transfer to Acquia Creek and
Alexandria were made as promptly as the order contemplated, the two
armies would be united before the enemy could reach them. McClellan,
however, continued day after day to protest against the change, and made
his preparations and embarkation with such exasperating slowness as
showed that he still hoped to induce the government to change its plans.
Pope, despite the fact that he had managed his retreat with skill and
bravery, was attacked by Lee's army, and fought the second battle of
Bull Run on August 30, under the disadvantage of having one of
McClellan's divisions entirely absent and the other failing to respond
to his order to advance to the attack on the first day. McClellan had
reached Alexandria on August 24; and notwithstanding telegram after
telegram from Halleck, ordering him to push Franklin's division out to
Pope's support, excuse and delay seemed to be his only response, ending
at last in his direct suggestion that Franklin's division be kept to
defend Washington, and Pope be left to "get out of his scrape" as best
he might.
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