In this way it happened that
without any order or express intention on the part of either the general
or the President, McClellan's duty became imperceptibly changed from
that of merely defending Washington city to that of an active campaign
into Maryland to follow the Confederate army.
This movement into Maryland was begun by both armies about September 4.
On the thirteenth of that month McClellan had reached Frederick, while
Lee was by that time across the Catoctin range at Boonsboro', but his
army was divided. He had sent a large part of it back across the
Potomac to capture Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg. On that day there
fell into McClellan's hands the copy of an order issued by General Lee
three days before, which, as McClellan himself states in his report,
fully disclosed Lee's plans. The situation was therefore, as follows: It
was splendid September weather, with the roads in fine condition.
McClellan commanded a total moving force of more than eighty thousand;
Lee, a total moving force of forty thousand. The Confederate army was
divided. Each of the separate portions was within twenty miles of the
Union columns; and before half-past six on the evening of September 13,
McClellan had full knowledge of the enemy's plans.
General Palfrey, an intelligent critic friendly to McClellan, distinctly
admits that the Union army, properly commanded, could have absolutely
annihilated the Confederate forces.
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