I
now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the
first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act
purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive
immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, they can
instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life
than I am willing to make, all cannot be accomplished that I had
designed outside of the city."
During the week succeeding the severe repulse at Cold Harbor, which
closed what may be summed up as Grant's campaign against Richmond, he
made his preparations to enter upon the second element of his general
plan, which may be most distinctively denominated the siege of
Petersburg, though, in fuller phraseology, it might be called the siege
of Petersburg and Richmond combined. But the amplification is not
essential; for though the operation and the siege-works embraced both
cities, Petersburg was the vital and vulnerable point. When Petersburg
fell, Richmond fell of necessity. The reason was, that Lee's army,
inclosed within the combined fortifications, could only be fed by the
use of three railroads centering at Petersburg; one from the southeast,
one from the south, and one with general access from the southwest.
Between these, two plank roads added a partial means of supply.
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