We
predict from knowledge, real or supposed, of facts which are associated
in our minds with any new subject under consideration. Children often
know in a general, vague, and indefinite way that which, for the sake of
a full and systematic knowledge, we may desire them to study. What
they know will unconsciously modify their expectations, and their
expectations in turn may modify their observations. We are apt to
believe that happens which we expect will happen. There ought to be no
difficulty, however, in finding simple and appropriate experiments with
which the child is entirely unacquainted, and in which anything beyond
the wildest guess work is, for him, impossible. The principal use which
can be made of this method is in the mere observation of what takes
place. Nothing which the child notices correctly need be rejected,
no matter how far removed from the chief event on the object of the
experiment. Care that the pupil shall see all, and separate the
essential from the accidental, is all that is necessary.
But the original investigator assigns reasons, and with care the
children may be allowed to attempt that. This, however, should not be
carried far; incorrect explanations should be criticised; and the class
should at length be given all the elements of the correct explanation
which they have not determined for themselves. Later, pupils should be
encouraged to name related phenomena, to mention things which they
have seen happen which are due to associated causes, and to suggest
variations for the experiment and tests for its explanation.
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